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Gaze and arrow cueing of attention reveals
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as a function of target context
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Observing averted gaze results in a reflexive shift of attention to the gazed-at location.
In two experiments, participants scoring high and low on the Autism-Spectrum
Quotient questionnaire (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley,
2001) observed arrow and gaze cues to investigate cueing effect magnitude as a function
of the context in which peripheral targets could appear. While identical cueing effects
were found with gaze and arrow cues, the more striking results concerned target
stimuli. In Experiment 1, targets could appear on a peripheral face, or on scrambled face
parts. Overall, greater cueing effects were found when the target appeared on a face.
However, this face bias was only observed in participants with low AQ scores, whereas
high AQ scorers oriented more to scrambled features. Experiment 2 found equal
cueing to targets appearing on tools, as compared with tool parts. However, individual
differences were again observed, where low AQ scorers showed larger cueing towards
tools, while high scorers oriented more to scrambled parts, as in Experiment 1. These
results support the idea that low AQ individuals orient strongly to objects attended by
others. However, since the same results were found for arrow cues, this effect may
generalize to all central cues to attention. High AQ scorers possessing many more
autistic-like traits tended to orient more to scrambled shapes, perhaps reflecting a bias
for orienting to local details.
The tendency to orient to the locus of another’s attention is clearly of great benefit to an
individual. As well as using other conspecifics orienting behaviour to alert the individual
to important objects or events in the environment, the ability to accurately encode
another’s direction of attention may allow at least a coarse representation of the mental
state of the observed individual to be constructed by the observer. That is, gaze
following may reflect early representations of other minds, leading to the development
of a full ‘Theory of Mind’ (Baron-Cohen, 1995; but see Moore & Corkum, 1994). Gaze
following has been found to emerge in infants as young as 3 months old (Hood, Willen,
& Driver, 1998; Scaife & Bruner, 1975). Recent studies in adults have shown that
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observing averted gaze results in a reflexive shift of covert attention (Driver et al., 1999;
Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Hietanen, 1999; Langton & Bruce, 1999).
Typically, studies investigating attention shifts following averted eye gaze have
presented a face in the centre of the screen, which looks to the left or right. A target then
appears on the screen, to the left or right of the face. Manual reaction time to detect,
localize or identify the target is shorter when the eyes look at the target location, even
when the cue is non-predictive. This paradigm is very effective at measuring the
attentional effects of gaze-following. Interestingly, non-predictive arrow stimuli seem to
have very similar effects on behaviour (Eimer, 1997; Hommel, Pratt, Colzato, & Godijn,
2001; Ristic, Friesen, & Kingstone, 2002; Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986; Tipples,
2002). However, gaze-cues are robust cues to attention, even when participants are told
that targets will probably appear at the opposite side of space to the cue, whereas top-
down control can be utilized more easily when other directional stimuli are anti-
predictive (Downing, Dodds, & Bray, 2004; Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004).
One intriguing difference between developmental studies on Joint Attention (where
‘two individuals are attending to the same object, based on one individual using the
attention cues of the second individual’; Emery, 2000, p. 588), and those using averted
gaze as a cue to attention, is that in gaze-cueing paradigms, no object is present until
target presentation. In development, infants are able to orient to the correct object of
another’s attention after around 12 months, before which time, the first object along the
line of sight tends to capture attention (Butterworth, 1991). Objects are also important
in joint attention episodes when one considers evidence that suggests that language
development is correlated with the development of joint attention (Baldwin, 1995).
A weak joint attention system, which fails to consistently orient to the correct object, may
impede the pairing of a visual object to its name, and hence slow vocabulary acquisition.
The importance of objects to orienting behaviour is also clear from the visuospatial
attention literature. For example, the attentional processes of excitation and inhibition
have been found to spread across an object’s surface (Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994; Jordan
& Tipper, 1999; Reppa & Leek, 2003). Thus, these studies showed that cueing one part
of an object resulted in larger attentional cueing (facilitation or inhibition) to targets
appearing in different parts of the same object than to equidistant targets that were part
of different objects. Other studies have shown that the inhibition that can be activated
via a sudden onset peripheral cue (i.e. inhibition of return; Posner & Cohen, 1984) is
larger if attention was oriented to an object rather than to an area of space filled with
random patterns with no apparent global form ( Jordan & Tipper, 1998). If objects are
the unit of attentional selection, then gaze-cueing should also evoke object-based cueing
effects, such that greater cueing should be observed towards objects, as compared to
towards displays that contain comparable density and complexity of visual information,
yet constitute no coherent visual object ( Jordan & Tipper, 1998).
We felt that the object category to be presented at target location may be important
when considering the context of social interactions that surround gaze-cueing effects. If
the objects upon which targets could appear were also themselves faces (Experiment 1),
then participants would be observing a highly complex visual scene (see Fig. 1, top
panel), in which three potentially mentalistic agents (participant, cue face and cued face)
are involved in a mutual attention-sharing episode. If observing this scene strongly
activates a social orienting mechanism, then gaze-evoked attention shifts should be much
larger than towards displays of scrambled face parts. If the observation of a social
interaction is critical, then a central cue other than eye-gaze would not evoke such a
difference in cueing. Although arrows are stimuli that are designed to communicate
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direction, they are nevertheless devoid of the socio-biological importance of a gaze-cue.
Therefore, if social interactions drive orienting to social stimuli, then greater cueing to
faces will only be observed when a face produces a gaze-cue. If object-based attention acts
regardless of the cue, then greater orienting to faces (as compared with scrambled face
parts) will be observed when a gaze or an arrow produces a cue.
A further concern of this study was the possibility that different individuals might
have different orienting biases, related to their overall cognitive processing style. That is,
some individuals will be strongly biased to orienting towards social stimuli, while others
will not show this bias. Such orienting biases are evident in the autism and sex
differences literature. For example, compared to normally developing children, infants
with autism spend little time orienting to people (Swettenham et al., 1998). Instead,
non-social objects are attended longer by infants with autism. Poor social skills and
communication are central to the impairments presented by people with autism.
Indeed, while normal children understand that gaze behaviour of others allows one to
infer the intentions and desires of mentalistic agents, children with autism seem to
utilize gaze on a more superficial level (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmilloff-Smith, Grant,
& Walker, 1995). Furthermore, children with autism often have poor joint attention
skills (Charman, 2003; Charman et al., 1997). Overall, the poor theory of mind skills in
people with autism (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1989) has led Baron-Cohen (2002) to suggest
that people with autism have a general profile of poor empathizing skills.
Figure 1. Illustration of the time-course of conditions in Experiment 1. The displays were preceded by
the presentation of a fixation cross in the centre of the screen, for 658 ms. Panels (a) and (b) illustrate
valid trials, since the target appears at the cued locations. Panels (c) and (d) are examples of invalid trials.
Note. Figure 1 is available in colour in the online article and from the author.
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The other significant aspect to the cognitive profile of people with autism-spectrum
disorders is the observation that many people with autism have good attention to
details, islets of ability and obsessions. A wider reaching theoretical framework that is
able to explain both triadic (e.g. impaired social, language and imagination skills) and
non-triadic symptoms of autism (e.g. attention to details) is needed to fully explain the
syndrome (Frith & Happe´, 1994). Weak central coherence in perception and processing
style has been posited as a deficit in processing global form, with a preserved or superior
ability to process local features (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe´, 1994; Happe´, 1999). Indeed,
people with autism have been shown to have a perceptual bias toward the processing of
local details of visual stimuli (Mottron, Belleville, & Menard, 1999; Mottron, Burack,
Iarocci, Belleville, & Enns, 2003), superior conjunctive visual search (O’Riordan,
Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001), and more fluent perceptual processing (Brian,
Tipper, Weaver, & Bryson, 2003).
As an alternative to weak central coherence, Baron-Cohen (2002) suggests that a bias
towards the processing of local features reflects the stronger tendency to systemize, to
attempt to understand and build systems. Indeed, children with autism are better at
understanding mechanical events than normally developing controls (Baron-Cohen,
Leslie, & Frith, 1986), and are more likely to have fathers or grandfathers who have been
engineers, perhaps reflecting the genetic basis underlying such traits (Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Stott, Bolton, & Goodyear, 1997). Hence, people with autism have a
cognitive style that is associated with good systemizing, but poor empathizing skills.
However, the more direct relevance this theory has to this study is its relationship to
diversity in cognitive style in the normal population. Indeed, empathizing and
systemizing are predicted to vary within the normal population, and the majority of
evidence for this comes from sex differences in empathizing and systemizing abilities.
The extreme male brain theory of autism (Baron-Cohen, 2000, 2002, 2003) suggests that
exceptional systemizing and very poor empathizing skills are the hallmarks of the
extreme male brain, and of autism. Indeed, the vast majority of people with autism-
spectrum disorders are male (Rutter, 1978). Poor systemizing, but good empathizing
skills describe the cognitive style associated with the extreme female brain. While the
gender of the brain describes only cognitive style and is not necessarily fixed to
the biological sex of the person, normal sex differences in infancy and adulthood reflect
the idea that empathizing and systemizing vary within the normal population.
Sex differences are apparent from very early in life, since female neonates spend
more time looking at a human face than at a mobile, while male neonates show the
opposite preference (Connellan, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Batki, & Ahluwalia, 2000).
Furthermore, more eye contact is made by female infants than by male infants at
12 months old (Lutchmaya, Baron-Cohen, & Raggatt, 2002). Later in life, these biases are
equally striking. Many studies have shown gender differences on a wide range of
cognitive skills (see Geary, 1998, for review). Males outperform females in spatial tasks,
such as the water-level test (Robert & Ohlmann, 1994), mental rotation (Geary, Gilger,
& Elliott-Miller, 1992) and line-angle judgment (Collaer & Nelson, 2002), reflecting
superior processing of physical systems in males. Females have been found to perform
better in episodic memory tasks involving face recognition (Yonker, Eriksson, Nilsson,
& Herlitz, 2003). Also, males are more vulnerable to prosopagnosia, a disorder where
familiar faces cannot be recognized following brain damage (Mazzucchi & Biber, 1983).
Hall (1978) found that males were less sensitive to visual and auditory non-verbal cues to
emotion as compared with females. Furthermore, in a standard gaze-cueing paradigm
based on that of Driver et al. (1999), males showed weaker attentional effects of
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non-predictive eye-gaze cues, as compared to females (Bayliss, di Pellegrino, & Tipper, in
press). Interestingly, this sex difference was the same for arrow cues.
These sex differences in sensitivity to and processing fluency of, social and physical
stimuli support the extreme male brain hypothesis of autism. The idea that the male
population in general have more autistic-like traits than females is borne out by scores
on the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ), developed by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001), on
which males score higher than females. The AQ assesses social, communication and
imagination skills, attention to details and attention switching. If people have different
levels of autistic-like traits, then a number of predictions might be made about the
present study. If social cueing occurs when a face cues another face through averted eye-
gaze, then the cueing effect might be expected to be larger in participants who have few
autistic traits. When a scrambled display is cued, this pattern might be expected to be
absent, or even reversed, since the scrambled displays have the local details of an object,
yet form no global pattern, perhaps favouring the orienting biases of people with many
autistic traits. Hence, the AQ was given to participants in order to evaluate any possible
differences between people scoring high and low scores on the questionnaire.
A further possibility is also explored in this study. Experiment 1 investigates
orienting towards social stimuli (faces), compared to scrambled displays. Any
differences in orienting magnitudes towards the two types of stimuli could be inferred
as being due to the fact that faces are sociobiological stimuli, and scrambled objects are
not. Conversely, object coherence could determine cueing magnitude regardless of
object category. In order to evaluate these opposing hypotheses, Experiment 2 used an
identical procedure, but with whole tools, compared with scrambled tool parts, as the
target object context. If object category is important in the modulation of cueing
magnitude, then different results would be predicted for Experiment 2, as compared
with Experiment 1. Any differences between participants with high and low AQ scores
in Experiments 1 and 2 would be especially interesting, since while we predict that low
AQ participants would be cued very strongly towards faces by an eye-gaze cue, one
might predict that high AQ participants would be strongly cued by an arrow towards
tools. However, if object coherence alone determines cueing magnitude, then identical
results will be obtained in the two experiments. Nevertheless, how AQ score might
modulate cueing magnitude across these two procedures is a somewhat open question.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Twenty-five naı¨ve participants (mean age ¼ 20:3 years; 5 males) took part for payment
or course credit. They were recruited from the University of Wales, Bangor student
population and the School of Psychology participant panel. All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus
The stimulus set consisted of three male and three female faces, which could either have
the pupils in the centre, in the left or in the right of the eyes. These faces were used as
the gaze-cues and the target placeholders on some trials. The faces were divided into
several parts which were rotated and reorganized randomly to create six scrambled face
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objects, upon which targets could appear during half the trials. The dimensions of the
faces varied from 10 £ 9 cm to 13 £ 13.5 cm. Pupil size was approximately
0.8 £ 0.8 cm. Six differently designed arrows were also created. Arrows varied
between 4.8 £ 2 cm and 7 £ 3 cm. The area that the target covered was matched to the
size of the visible regions of skin of the six faces, measuring from 6 £ 9 cm to
8 £ 11 cm. Targets were presented as red patches over the faces, or over the scrambled
face parts (see Fig. 1). In this way, the targets would be perceived as changes to the
stimuli, rather than as new objects appearing on the scene. Such semi-transparent
patches have been used before in cueing paradigms (Tipper, Grison, & Kessler, 2003).
Red patches were used as target stimuli since they could be perceived as representing a
biologically plausible state (i.e. blushing), which can occur during social interactions.
Design
The within-subject factor, Cue Type, was whether the cue was an arrow or a face with
averted gaze. Target Object Type was whether the central arrow or face was flanked by
faces or scrambled face parts. Finally, Validity was included, where direction of the cue
(left or right) was congruent with target location in valid trials, and incongruent on
invalid trials. Other facets to the design were not included in the analyses, but are noted
below. In gaze-face trials, the flanking faces were always of the opposite gender to the
cueing face.1 Because of the inclusion of this, it was necessary to balance this
manipulation by arbitrarily splitting the scrambled faces into two groups – a set of three
that could only appear when the centre face was male and another three that could
appear when the central face was female. A similar arbitrary process was applied to the
arrows, by also treating the six arrows as two sets of three.
The autism spectrum quotient
The 50-item questionnaire is a self-rated scale, assessing normal participants’ social
skills, communication skills, imagination ability, attention switching (these four traits are
generally poor in people with Autism-Spectrum disorders) and attention to details
abilities (this trait is often exceptional in people with Autism-Spectrum disorders).
Participants responded to 10 statements regarding each of the five assessed traits,
reporting whether they ‘strongly agree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘slightly disagree’ or ‘strongly
disagree’ with each statement. The higher the score on the AQ, the greater number of
autistic traits the subject possessed.
Procedure
Participants were instructed to respond to the presentation of a target by hitting the
spacebar as soon as they detected the onset of the red patch. They were also informed
that the direction of the central cue did not predict target location, and that they should
ignore it, while maintaining central fixation throughout each trial. On each trial, a
fixation cross was presented on a blank screen for 658 ms. This was followed by the
1 Experiments investigating the effect of sex of participant and gender of face on cueing magnitude were being conducted
concurrently with this investigation (see Bayliss et al., in press). For this reason, this design feature was included as an additional
manipulation. However, Bayliss et al. found no differential cueing effects for male and female faces. For this reason, and for
concerns regarding statistical power, this design feature was not analysed. Hence, the focus of this study is target context and
individual differences.
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presentation of the central cue (either an arrow or a gazing face) in its neutral position
(eyes central, or arrows without arrow heads). Simultaneously, two pictures would
appear to the left and right of the centre. These pictures would either be faces looking
towards the centre, or two areas of scrambled face parts. The faces were looking
towards the centre so that at cue onset, the cue and cued faces would be looking at each
other. In this way, the impression of observing an unfolding social interaction was felt to
be even more salient to participants. For this reason, gaze towards the centre was
preferred to the alternatives: no eye gaze in peripheral faces would have given an
unnatural feel to the scene, and a straight-ahead gaze might have resulted in additional
attentional capture towards the peripheral faces, compared with the scrambled
displays. This display would remain for 1,504 ms before the central cue appeared.
This cue was achieved by the movement of the eyes, or the appearance of arrow-heads.2
The target would then appear on one of the peripheral objects, after 376 ms (see Fig. 1).
This display remained until response, or until 2,491 ms had elapsed. A blank screen was
then presented for 1,269 ms after each trial. Participants completed a practice block of
15 trials, followed by four blocks of 84 trials. One seventh of trials were catch trials,
where no target was presented, leaving 288 trials for analysis. The stimulus set for each
trial was selected randomly. At the end of the experiment, all but one participant
completed the AQ questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
Results
Reaction time data
In total, there were few errors (0.4% of trials). A further 5.3% of trials were removed as
Reaction Time (RT) outliers (where RT was shorter than 150 ms, longer than 1,000 ms,
and was more than 2 SD above or below the participant’s cell mean). The remaining data
points contributed to means for each participant in each condition, which were
submitted to repeated measures ANOVA, with Validity (valid or invalid), Cue Type
(arrow or eyes) and Target Object Type (face or scrambled face parts) as factors
(see Fig. 2).
The main effect of Validity was highly significant, Fð1; 24Þ ¼ 31:1, p , :001, with
RTs to valid targets being quicker than to invalid targets (318 vs. 331 ms). The Cue Type
by Target Object Type interaction reached significance, Fð1; 24Þ ¼ 4:91, p ¼ :036,
because when the cue was an arrow, RTs were faster when targets appeared on a face
(321 ms) than when targets appeared on scrambled face parts (327 ms). When gaze was
the cue, this trend was not apparent, with RTs of 325 and 324 ms to targets on faces and
scrambled face parts, respectively. As this interaction is unrelated to hypotheses, and did
not involve Validity, it will not be considered further. The non-significant main effect of
Target Object Type, Fð1; 24Þ ¼ 1:99, p ¼ :17, shows that, independently of cueing
effects, RTs to targets appearing on either target type were equivalent, demonstrating
that targets appearing on both the coherent and scrambled displays were equally
2 Most studies use eye-gaze cues in which the pupils do not move, but appear in their averted gaze position. In this particular
study, it was felt that direct gaze at the start of the trial, followed by a realistic shifting of gaze position, would provide additional
ecological validity. The impact of pupil motion on gaze-cueing is negligible (Hietanen & Leppanen, 2003). While the pupils
move, the arrow-head does not. This difference was again due to the attempt to present cues to attention in an ecologically
valid way (Kingstone, Smilek, Ristic, Friesen, & Eastwood, 2003). Hence, moving eyes, compared to the more standard onset-
arrow cue, was used in order to detect any possible differences in the basic cueing effects of either cue.
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discriminable. This suggests that extracting the target from the background is equally
demanding in both conditions. The effect that was of direct interest to the hypothesis
was the three-way Cue Type by Target Object Type by Validity, which did not approach
significance, Fð1; 24Þ , 1. However, the Target Object Type by Validity interaction
was significant, Fð1; 24Þ ¼ 5:45, p ¼ :028. This was due to a greater effect of Validity
(i.e. more cueing) in trials where targets appeared on faces (314 vs. 332 ms; 18 ms
cueing), than when scrambled face parts were presented as target placeholders (320 vs.
330 ms; 10 ms cueing). These two results suggest that cueing magnitude was only
modulated by Target Object Type. However, Cue Type had no reliable influence on
cueing magnitude, since the Cue type by Validity interaction did not approach
significance, Fð1; 24Þ , 1 (see Fig. 2).
Analysis of AQ score
Analysis of the AQ scores in this sample revealed a mean of 15.5 (SD ¼ 5:9) out of 50
(N ¼ 24; one questionnaire was not completed). Given that most (19 out of 24) of our
respondents were female, this mean score is very similar to that found in the original
study, when testing normal females (M ¼ 15:4, N ¼ 98; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001, p. 8).
It was hypothesized that those who scored highly on this questionnaire may display less
attentional cueing towards social stimuli (i.e. targets appearing on a face) than those
with low scores on the AQ. Based on the distributions of scores reported by Baron-
Cohen et al. (2001), the cut-off scores were chosen to allow approximately 40% of our
sample into either group. Those participants who scored 18 or more were included in
the high group (M ¼ 21:9, SD ¼ 3:1, N ¼ 9). Participants with a score of 13 or lower
were included in the low group (M ¼ 10:4, SD ¼ 2:4, N ¼ 11). These groups’ scores
differed significantly, tð18Þ ¼ 9:49, p , :001. Four participants with intermediary scores
(one with 16, and three with 15) were excluded from either group.
Statistical analysis, similar to that described above, was performed on the remaining
20 participants’ data, with AQ group as an additional between-subjects factor. Again,
Validity reached significance, Fð1; 18Þ ¼ 24:1, p , :001, with faster RTs to validly cued
targets (308 vs. 321 ms). In this analysis, the pattern of results of larger cueing to targets
Figure 2. Graph of mean RTs (ms) for each condition in Experiment 1.
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presented on a face than to targets presented on a display of scrambled face parts was
not found. That is, the Target Object Type by Validity interaction did not approach
significance, Fð1; 18Þ ¼ 1:14, p ¼ :30, with 15 ms cueing to targets on a face, and 12 ms
to targets on a display of scrambled face parts.
However, there was a significant Target Object Type by Validity by AQ group
interaction, Fð1; 18Þ ¼ 6:20, p ¼ :023 (see Fig. 3 and Table 1). This interaction was due
to greater cueing to targets presented on a face in the low AQ group, but greater cueing
to targets presented on the scrambled face parts in the high AQ group. Contrasts
showed that the low AQ participants were cued to both faces, Fð1; 10Þ ¼ 20:7,
p , :001, and to scrambled face parts, Fð1; 10Þ ¼ 10:3, p ¼ :009. The high AQ group
also showed significant cueing towards faces, Fð1; 8Þ ¼ 6:56, p ¼ :034, and towards
scrambled face parts, Fð1; 8Þ ¼ 5:70, p ¼ :044. Note that again, there were no
interactions with Cue Type, indicating that the observed individual differences were due
to target object properties, not to cue properties.
Discussion
This experiment aimed to evaluate whether the magnitude of orienting to the direction
of observed gaze direction could be modulated by the context in which the target could
appear. It was found that cueing to targets appearing on faces was larger than cueing to
the same targets appearing on scrambled face parts. This effect was found for both gaze
cues and arrow cues, suggesting that cue properties had little effect on cueing
magnitude. This was contrary to our hypothesis that proposed that any modulation of
cueing towards faces or non-faces would only be evident when the cue was averted
gaze, produced by a face. The results therefore suggest that observing a social
interaction between cue and target, when both are faces, does not result in more cueing
than observing an arrow pointing to a face. These data therefore again demonstrate the
strikingly similar behavioural effects of non-predictive gaze and arrow-cues on attention,
which have been observed before (Bayliss et al., in press; Ristic et al., 2002; Tipples,
2002). Importantly, there was no main effect of Target Object Type, demonstrating that
presenting targets on coherent objects versus scrambled object parts results in very
similar raw performance. Unpublished pilot data demonstrated that comparing RTs to
targets appearing on objects versus in empty space resulted in a large RT advantage for
Figure 3. Graph illustrating cueing effect sizes for each AQ group, for either target object type, in
Experiments 1 and 2.
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targets appearing on objects, and hence we decided that a stimulus set which controlled
for this should be used in the present study. Scrambled objects were deemed
appropriate because detection of the target should be as demanding in both coherent
and scrambled conditions, and they also allowed us to investigate the influence of
observing local features forming no coherent object in terms of a systemizing account
of individual differences.
The response patterns of participants scoring high on the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001) were very different from those with low scores. Participants reporting few autism-
like traits (low AQ) displayed an exaggerated cueing pattern compared with that
described above: twice as much cueing towards targets appearing on faces, than to
targets appearing on scrambled face parts. High scorers (reporting more autistic-like
traits) showed the opposite trend, with slightly greater cueing to targets appearing
on scrambled face parts. Again, these group differences were the same with gaze and
arrow cues.
This suggests that greater cueing towards faces from a central cue only occurs in
people whose cognitive style is biased to the processing of social information. This
finding mirrors that of Swettenham et al. (1998), who showed that children with autism
made fewer attention shifts towards people than normally developing children did.
Similarly, Connellan et al. (2000) showed that female neonates attended a face for
longer, compared with a mobile decorated with scrambled face parts, while male
neonates showed the opposite trend. The similarity between these findings and those of
Experiment 1 is clear – processing style is highly influential in determining the depth to
which social information is processed.
In summary, it appears that when socially relevant stimuli such as faces are objects
towards which attention can be oriented, differences between high and low scorers on
the AQ can be detected. However, to be confident that the individual differences reflect
differences in orienting to social stimuli such as faces, a further test is required. Hence,
in replacing the face target holders with tools, Experiment 2 allowed us to examine
whether object coherence or social relevance is the important factor in determining the
magnitude of attentional shifts away from a central, non-predictive cue.
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1, except that
the objects that would act as target placeholders were power tools, not faces, and the
scrambled displays were now made up of tool parts. Tools were considered an
appropriate contrast to the faces used in Experiment 1 for several reasons. Firstly, tools
Table 1. Mean reaction times (ms) for each AQ group in Experiments 1 and 2, across all conditions.
Standard errors in parenthesis (ms)
Coherent objects Scrambled objects
Gaze cue Arrow cue Gaze cue Arrow cue
Experiment 1 (faces) Low AQ (N ¼ 11) Valid 315 (10.1) 307 (8.6) 315 (10.5) 318 (10.9)
Invalid 333 (12.3) 329 (10.4) 326 (11.1) 329 (14.6)
High AQ (N ¼ 9) Valid 303 (17.3) 296 (15.3) 303 (18.2) 298 (15.8)
Invalid 312 (16.2) 305 (15.5) 310 (17.3) 314 (15.9)
Experiment 2 (tools) Low AQ (N ¼ 13) Valid 305 (11.1) 310 (13.1) 312 (12.9) 315 (13.1)
Invalid 326 (13.6) 326 (13.6) 323 (14.2) 329 (15.0)
High AQ (N ¼ 9) Valid 350 (22.3) 352 (22.0) 347 (24.3) 349 (22.6)
Invalid 364 (21.0) 365 (23.7) 367 (23.2) 367 (24.5)
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are non-social objects. Thus, if the results from Experiment 1 were due to the use of
social stimuli, rather than an effect of presenting a coherent object of any category, then
one would predict no repeat of the Validity by Target Object Type interaction that was
found in Experiment 1. Secondly, while faces as an object category seem to selectively
activate occipito-temporal regions in the ventral visual stream, such as the fusiform face
area (FFA) and superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000;
Hoffman & Haxby, 2000), the observation of tools tends to reveal patterns of activation
in the dorsal visual stream, such as the parietal lobe (Chao & Martin, 2000). Thirdly, tools
are similar to faces in that they are complex objects made up of several different parts,
yet have very different processing demands, and hence may reveal different individual
differences from those of Experiment 1. Indeed, one may predict that participants with
high AQ scores may now be cued more to tools than low AQ scorers, since Baron-Cohen
(2003) suggests that people further along the autism spectrum have superior
systemizing abilities, and hence are drawn to physical systems such as mechanical
objects (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997).
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
Twenty-five naı¨ve participants (mean age ¼ 23:7 years; 5 males) took part for payment.
They were recruited from the student population of the University of Wales, Bangor. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus
Instead of faces, six pictures of tools were used (a multi-tool, a vacuum cleaner, a drill,
two planers and a circular saw). Sections of each tool were cut and rotated to create
scrambled images of tool parts. Targets were presented as red, transparent patches on
the main body of the tools, and the shape of these patches were used as the shape on the
scrambled tool parts displays (see Fig. 4).
Design and procedure
The design and procedure were identical to that of Experiment 1, with the exception
that the levels of the Target Object Type variable were now tools or scrambled tool
parts.
Results
Reaction time data
In total, there were few errors (0.2% of trials). A further 4.0% of trials were removed as
RT outliers (where RT was shorter than 150 ms, longer than 1,000 ms, and was more
than 2 SD above or below the participant’s cell mean). The remaining data contributed
to means for each participant in each condition, which were submitted to repeated
measures ANOVA, with Validity (valid or invalid), Cue Type (arrow or eyes) and Target
Object Type (tool or scrambled tool parts) as factors (see Fig. 5).
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Figure 4. Illustration of the time-course of conditions in Experiment 2. The displays were preceded by
the presentation of a fixation cross in the centre of the screen, for 658 ms. Panels (a) and (b) illustrate
invalid trials, since the target appears at the un-cued locations. Panels (c) and (d) are examples of valid
trials. Note. Figure 4 is available in colour in the online article and from the author.
Figure 5. Graph of mean RTs for each condition, for Experiment 2.
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The only main effect to reach significance was Validity, Fð1; 24Þ ¼ 76:4, p , :001,
with faster RTs to valid targets (324 vs. 339 ms). No other main effects or interactions
approached significance (all F-ratios,1.9), including the Target Object Type by Validity
interaction, which was central to the hypothesis, Fð1; 24Þ , 1, with the validity effect
being the same whether the target appeared on a tool (323 vs. 339 ms; 16 ms cueing) or
on a scrambled display of tool parts (324 vs. 339 ms; 15 ms cueing).
Analysis of AQ score
The 25 participants scored an average of 14.8 (SD ¼ 5:8) on the AQ questionnaire.
Thirteen participants scored 13 or less, and were assigned to the low AQ group
(M ¼ 10:3, SD ¼ 2:3), and the nine scoring 18 or more were assigned to the high AQ
group (M ¼ 21:2, SD ¼ 3:9). The two groups’ scores were significantly different,
tð20Þ ¼ 8:29, p , :001. Two participants scoring 15 and one scoring 14 were not
included in either group. These 22 participants’ data were reanalysed as in Experiment
1, with AQ group as an additional between-groups factor. ANOVA revealed a significant
effect of Validity, Fð1; 20Þ ¼ 60:8, p , :001. The only other interaction to reach
significance, just as in Experiment 1, was the Target Object Type by Validity by AQ group
interaction, Fð1; 20Þ ¼ 4:72, p ¼ :042. Again, this was due to the low AQ group
showing greater cueing to coherent objects (tools; 19 ms cueing) than to scrambled tool
parts (13 ms cueing), while the high AQ group showed the opposite pattern, being cued
more to scrambled tool parts (19 ms cueing) than to tools (14 ms cueing, see Fig. 3).
Contrasts again showed significant cueing effects in the low AQ group towards tools,
Fð1; 12Þ ¼ 29:4, p , :001, and towards scrambled tool parts, Fð1; 12Þ ¼ 12:4,
p ¼ :004. The high AQ group were also cued towards tools, Fð1; 8Þ ¼ 30:0, p , :001,
and to scrambled tool parts, Fð1; 8Þ ¼ 31:5, p , :001.
Discussion
The purpose of this experiment was to contextualize the results observed in
Experiment 1, where non-informative arrow and gaze cues produced greater attentional
effects when targets appeared on faces, as compared to scrambled face parts. This
second experiment showed that the magnitude of cueing was not modulated by
whether the targets appeared on a different object category, that is, tools, as compared
to scrambled tool parts. This suggests that cueing is only modulated when the target
appears on a social/biological stimulus such as a face. However, the results of the AQ,
suggest an alternative interpretation may be appropriate.
Experiment 1 showed that only low AQ scorers (i.e. those who rated themselves as
possessing few autism-like traits) contributed to the effect of greater cueing towards
faces than to scrambled face parts. High AQ scorers (possessing more autism-like traits),
showed instead a trend for greater cueing towards the scrambled displays. While
Experiment 2 demonstrated no overall difference in cueing towards tools, compared to
scrambled displays, this too was shown to be a product of two different orienting biases
in either AQ group (see Fig. 3). Low scorers again were cued to the coherent objects
(tools) more than to the scrambled displays, though this difference was smaller than in
Experiment 1. The high AQ group again showed the opposite trend, with more cueing
to the scrambled displays than to the coherent object.
These results show that cueing towards tools is not greater in high AQ participants,
as might be predicted if one considers that good folk physics (Baron-Cohen, 2000) and
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superior systemizing skills (Baron-Cohen, 2002) are associated with people with high
AQ scores, hence sharing more traits with people with autism-spectrum disorders. The
fact that very similar results were found in Experiments 1 and 2 suggests that
participants with high AQ scores readily orient towards scrambled displays, irrespective
of object category. The following analysis investigated whether any differences in group
performance were present between participants in Experiments 1 and 2.
Combined analysis of the effect of AQ group in Experiments 1 and 2
In order to evaluate the high and low AQ groups orienting effects over both
experiments, the data from high AQ and low AQ scorers were analysed in a combined
ANOVA. As before, Validity, Cue Type and Target Object Type were within-subjects
factors. The levels of Target Object Type factor were Coherent Object (i.e. a face or a
tool), or Scrambled Object (i.e. scrambled face or tool parts). Between-subjects factors
were AQ group and Experiment.
Validity was highly significant, Fð1; 38Þ ¼ 77:5, p , :001. The Cue Type by
Experiment interaction approached significance, Fð1; 38Þ ¼ 3:95, p ¼ :054, due to
faster RTs when the cue was an arrow in Experiment 1 (312 vs. 314 ms), but faster RTs
when the cue was averted gaze in Experiment 2 (336 vs. 339 ms). This interaction did
not involve Validity, and was not involved in predictions, so it is not considered further.
The overall Target Object Type by Validity interaction did not reach significance,
Fð1; 38Þ ¼ 1:44, p ¼ :24. However, the critical three-way interaction of Target Object
Type by Validity by AQ group was highly significant, Fð1; 38Þ ¼ 9:69, p ¼ :004. The low
AQ group showed more cueing towards targets appearing on coherent objects (20 ms)
than on scrambled objects (11 ms), while the high AQ group showed the opposite
pattern of more cueing towards targets appearing on scrambled objects (15 ms) than on
coherent objects (12 ms). No other effects approached significance. Follow-up ANOVAs
showed that there was a Target Object Type by Validity interaction in the low AQ group,
Fð1; 22Þ ¼ 8:30, p ¼ :009, whereas there was a trend in the opposite direction in the
high AQ group, Fð1; 16Þ ¼ 2:75, p ¼ :117 (see Fig. 3 and Table 1). This analysis
demonstrates that the modulation of cueing by Target Object Type and AQ group was
consistent across Experiments 1 and 2.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study investigated the effect of manipulating target object context on the
magnitude of attentional cueing via the observation of non-informative directional
arrows or eye-gaze. Consistent cueing effects were found in all conditions, replicating
several studies, with non-predictive gaze cues (e.g. Driver et al., 1999; Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998), and non-predictive arrow cues (Eimer, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001;
Ristic et al., 2002; Shepherd et al., 1986; Tipples, 2002).
The manipulation of target object context (i.e. whether the target appeared as part of
a coherent visual object, or a meaningless scrambled display) was made, in part, as an
attempt to reveal differences between eyes and arrows as cues to attention. It was
predicted that since in naturalistic situations eye-gaze allows the sharing of experience
in shared or joint attention, the presence of objects in the display would allow the
stronger activation of joint attention mechanisms. Such mechanisms were not predicted
to be so strongly active when observing an arrow. However, arrows and eyes had
identical effects on cueing magnitude in this paradigm. It is interesting that gaze and
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arrow cues had such similar effects on attention. The similarities between gaze and
arrow cueing in the normal population are indeed striking. The two cues produced the
same magnitude of effect (Tipples, 2002), across a similar time-course, both effects
appear by age 3–5 years (Ristic et al., 2002), both reveal a gender difference such that
normal females are more strongly cued by gaze and arrow cues than males are (Bayliss
et al., 2004). While symbolic cueing appears to rely on separate neural substrates from
gaze cueing (Kingstone, Friesen, & Gazzaniga, 2000; Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic, & Ngan,
2004; Ristic et al., 2002; Vuilleumier, 2002), it is only when cues are anti-predictive that
behavioural differences have been found so far. That is, when the participant is aware
that the target will usually appear at the location opposite to the cued location, top-
down strategic control of attention is unable to suppress the effect of eye-gaze cues, but
can override the automatic cueing effect of symbolic cues (Downing et al., 2004; Friesen
et al., 2004). Interestingly, Pellicano and Rhodes (2003) have recently demonstrated that
conflicting arrows disrupt normal children’s ability to infer mental states such as desire
and intention from eye-gaze cues. That is, when an arrow points to a different object to
that which is looked at by a cartoon character, the character is often thought to want the
object indicated by the arrow, not the eye-gaze. This suggests that similarities between
eye and arrow cues exist both for high- and low-level functions that these cues have. The
origin of any differences between the encoding and function of eyes and arrows is
clearly of importance to further research in this area.
Greater cueing towards faces, compared with scrambled displays, was found
(Experiment 1). While this result overall did not generalize to tools (Experiment 2), this
null effect was due to opposing patterns of cueing magnitude in high AQ and low AQ
participants. In both experiments, the high AQ participants showed greater cueing
towards scrambled displays than to coherent visual objects. Although this trend failed to
reach significance, it was in stark contrast to the pattern showed by low AQ participants.
Low AQ participants showed more cueing towards coherent objects than to scrambled
displays, with this trend being more exaggerated in Experiment 1 (faces).
Firstly, the low scorers on the AQ will be considered. These participants rate
themselves as having relatively good social, communication, imagination and attention
switching skills, but relatively poor attention to details. These participants displayed
greater cueing towards coherent visual objects than to scrambled displays. This effect
was numerically larger when the coherent visual object was a face (Experiment 1) than a
tool (Experiment 2), as might be expected in a group biased towards social interactions.
The overall pattern that low-AQ participants were cued more to real objects than to
meaningless objects has implications for other research. For example, Jordan and Tipper
(1998) showed a similar result in a peripheral cueing study, however they did not
examine the critical variable of individual differences. Therefore the general claim that
objects have much more behavioural relevance than incoherent random patterns, might
not be true for all individuals.
The high-AQ participants, on the other hand, show very different patterns of cueing.
In both experiments, there was no evidence for greater cueing towards the coherent
objects, but trends for greater cueing towards scrambled object parts. The results from
Experiment 1 were predicted, since high-AQ participants rated themselves as having
poorer social skills, their orienting bias may be comparable to that of male infants
(Connellan et al., 2000; Lutchmaya & Baron-Cohen, 2002; Lutchmaya et al., 2002),
where females oriented preferentially to social stimuli, but males oriented more to non-
social scrambled, or mechanical displays.
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In contrast, the idea that males have a bias towards processing mechanical stimuli,
led to the prediction that orienting to tools, in Experiment 2, would be larger than
scrambled displays in high-AQ participants. Instead, the same trend for greater orienting
to the scrambled displays was found. This result led us to consider that the scrambled
displays were not necessarily ‘meaningless’ displays, but rather were displays containing
high levels of detail that is appealing to the systematizing cognitive style of high-AQ
individuals. As noted before, high-AQ participants tend to have good attention to details
(Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003; Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001). This bias for attending to details is similar to the local bias in object processing in
participants with diagnoses of autism-spectrum disorders (Mottron et al., 1999, 2003).
Hence, tools, as a complex object perhaps contained less complexity for a system biased
to the processing of objects in terms of local details than a scrambled display with no
obvious global grouping pattern.
Clearly, the two AQ groups displayed very different cueing patterns in this study.
However, whether the two groups are displaying differences between object-based and
non-object (i.e. location) based attentional orienting remains an open issue. Note that
the random feature displays possessed a symmetrical global shape (i.e. rectangle).
Therefore it is possible that this stimulus was also encoded as an object in early figure-
ground processing. Therefore one interpretation could be that our data do not reflect
contrasts between object- and location-based representations (e.g. Jordan & Tipper,
1998); but rather they only reflect contrasts between coherent meaningful objects with
incoherent meaningless objects. We gratefully acknowledge an anonymous reviewer for
this insight, and further studies that match low level figure-ground properties but vary
coherence of the features that are important for object identification, will be necessary
to resolve this issue.
With regard to our sample of mainly female undergraduates (40 of the 50 participants),
it is likely that the sample was skewed towards the non-autistic end of the normal
distribution of the autism spectrum (Baron-Cohen, 2002, 2003; Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001). Since much of the evidence for individual differences in social and spatial
cognition comes from the sex-difference literature (Bayliss et al., in press; Connellan et al.,
2000; Geary, 1998; Geary et al., 1992; Hall, 1978; Lutchmaya & Baron-Cohen, 2002;
Lutchmaya et al., 2002), the use of a predominantly female sample may be problematic.
However, Baron-Cohen (2002, 2003) suggests that while sex differences exist, and
perhaps contribute to the variation of autism traits in the normal population, a normal
distribution of traits exists in either gender. Indeed, scores on the AQ are distributed
normally in both male and female populations (see Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). It is
therefore felt that these experiments effectively compare normal non-autistic
participants whose scores fall on either side of the population mean. By randomly
recruiting participants of either sex, we sampled a gender ratio similar to that of many
psychology experiments, since many psychology studies are conducted on psychology
students, who are predominantly female. In this way, this study demonstrates that in a
given random sample, individual differences exist in a standard cognitive psychology
paradigm (cueing of spatial attention), with the same sampling method as used by
researchers not investigating individual differences. It is highly likely that equal numbers
of males and females would have revealed even stronger group differences, since more
males would have increased the numbers of high-AQ participants. However, the
differences might have then been indistinguishable from a general sex difference. Instead,
taking the approach of testing the AQ of each participant allowed us to test the idea that
autistic traits truly vary in the normal population, somewhat independently of gender.
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Inevitably, therefore, this study is more descriptive of low-AQ participants’ behaviour.
However, according to Baron-Cohen’s et al. (2001) study, social science students score
lower than average on the AQ. This therefore implies that many research samples (in
studies where individual differences are not investigated) might be skewed in this way.
In conclusion, these experiments demonstrate that the use of central non-predictive
cues can produce object-based attentional effects. However, orienting to coherent visual
objects was only larger in participants rating themselves as having few autistic traits.
This finding highlights the importance of considering such individual differences in
attentional cueing studies. This design, which differed from many symbolic cueing
studies by manipulating the object on which targets may appear, adds flexibility to
central cueing paradigms in terms of ecological validity. It is notable that gaze cues were
not observed to be more effective than arrow cues in low-AQ compared with high-AQ
participants, illustrating the similar effects of arrows and eye-gaze on attention in these
two groups. Rather, these experiments have revealed for the first time that it is the
nature of the objects towards which attention is oriented that is more likely to reveal the
effects of different information processing styles.
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